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The precarious political economy of cobalt: Balancing prosperity, poverty, and 
brutality in artisanal and industrial mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
1. Introduction 
 The staggering rate of adoption of digital devices and electronics in our modern 
society has resulted in astronomical growth in critical mineral resources such as cobalt.  
Baldé et al. (2017) note that at the end of 2017, roughly half of the world population accessed 
the World Wide Web and high-speed internet, and most people have access to mobile 
telephone networks and services. In more concrete numbers: the world counts 7.7 billion 
mobile cellular subscriptions; almost half of all global households (48%) have a computer; 
and the value of global electronic commerce surpassed $22 trillion in 2017.  Such phones and 
computers, as well as other technologies such as electric vehicles, wind turbines, 
automobiles, lighting, solar panels, and even fuel cells and nuclear reactors, all depend on a 
“mineral foundation” of raw materials such as cobalt (Bazilian 2018).  Indeed, ERG (2018) 
estimates that due to the Paris Agreement, a 50-fold increase in electric vehicle adoption 
needs to occur between 2016 and 2030, reaching 100 million electric vehicles by that year.  
Thus, the cobalt demand in electric vehicle batteries is expected to grow by 200% between 
now and 2020, and again by 500% by 2025, when the battery market is expected to be worth 
$100 billion (ERG 2018).  For reasons such as these, Lindberg and Andersson (2019) write 
that cobalt is the modern-day “oil” of a low-carbon economy. 
 A mining boom has thus been underway for critical metals needed to manufacture 
such technologies.  Al Barazi et al. (2017) note that already, global cobalt demand jumped 
from 65,000 tons in 2010 to more than 90,000 tons per year in 2015, and that the DRC was 
the largest producer, responsible for roughly 60% of global supply. More than 50% of the 
word’s cobalt goes directly into batteries for phones, computers, and electric vehicles, leading 
analysts to declare it the “hottest commodity” of 2017 (Nuklu et al. 2018).  Industry experts 
expect to see 2020 demand reach 120,000 tons of cobalt production per year, and in February 
2018 cobalt prices were more than 150 percent higher than the previous year (Katz-Lavigne 
2019a). Moores (2018) similarly project that cobalt demand will jump from to 144,000 tons 
in 2023 to 218,400 tons by 2028.  Although non-cobalt-based rechargeable battery 
alternatives are being developed, and manufacturers are also trying to minimize the amount 
of cobalt in batteries, the implication is that demand for cobalt will rise well into the future.  
 But is this mining boom actually a positive development for the Congolese people?  
Civil society groups and the popular media in particular have published a series of reports 
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and articles arguing that the informal mining sector in the DRC ignores occupational safety 
and health standards, and violates human rights protections (Amnesty International 2016a; 
Amnesty International 2016b; Kara 2018: Lindberg and Andersson 2019).  Does it? 
Furthermore, the more industrialized, large-scale mining sector has been critiqued for 
embracing a process of formalization that merely solidifies state control, fails to reduce 
poverty, breeds corruption, entrenches elitism, and in some instances perpetuates violence 
(Geenen 2011; Perks 2011; Geenen 2012; Verweijen 2017; Zeuner 2018; Geenen and 
Cuvelier 2019).  Does it still? 
Based on extensive and original field research in the DRC—including expert 
interviews, community interviews, and naturalistic observation at mining sites—this study 
asks: How is cobalt currently extracted in the DRC?  What benefits has cobalt mining 
brought communities in the DRC?   What risks has it created? And, critically, what policies 
need implemented to make mining there more equitable sustainable?  It documents six 
interrelated benefits to cobalt mining: poverty reduction, community development, regional 
stability, ancillary markets, state revenue, and a strong social and cultural identity. However, 
it situates these alongside six serious challenges: accidents and occupational hazards, 
environmental pollution and degraded community health, exploitation of miners and unfair 
market practices, the erosion of democracy via corruption and malfeasance, displacement of 
indigenous peoples, and violent conflict and death.  The article then draws from its empirical 
data to propose seven policy recommendations.  
 In pursuing this path, the main contribution the article intends to make is humanizing 
the plight of cobalt miners in the DRC, and revealing the tensions and tradeoffs associated 
with the recent mining boom.  Nonetheless, even though its primary objective is empirical 
rather than conceptual, the study is novel in multiple ways. It assesses both artisanal and 
small-scale mining (ASM) alongside large-scale industrial mining (LSM). It examines active 
and inactive sites. It relies on field research and site visits to the mines themselves as well as 
other parts of the supply chain including trading depots and processing centers.  It conducted 
expert interviews as well as community interviews with industrial miners, artisanal diggers, 
industrial and artisanal bosses, traders, refiners, crushers and sorters, and even union leaders 
and members of the mining police.  It lastly examines the dynamics of both ASM and LSM 
mining in the context of the DRC, a state known for weak oversight and governance (Katz-
Lavigne 2019b; Vogel 2018; Honke 2010), a place where corporate firms and mining 
associations operate with perhaps as much power as government actors, often placing miners 
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themselves at the bottom of a hierarchy of interests. This is what is meant by the framing of 
the study around a “precarious political economy,” where we see miners exploited by 
multiple actors across multiple dimensions. Furthermore, even though the study’s 
contribution is more confirmatory, or hypothesis confirming, than exploratory or hypothesis 
generating (Sovacool et al. 2018), it is hoped its data can inform others seeking to develop, 
synthesize, or test theories and concepts, especially those related to political economy, 
political ecology, and social justice.  
2. Copper and cobalt mining, case study selection and research methods  
 To begin, it is helpful to briefly describe the political and social contours of the DRC 
before introducing readers to the case study locations (in the former province of Katanga) and 
discussing the mixed methods utilized in the study. 
2.1 General background of the DRC 
The DRC is large country in Central Africa, with a geographic size roughly equivalent 
to that of mainland Western Europe. It is the second largest country in Africa, covering more 
than 2.3 million square kilometers, and the twentieth most populous country in the world, 
with almost 80 million people (KPMG 2018). The country has been known most recently for 
the outbreak of Ebola in the northeast, as well as more historically-rooted rebel fighting and 
militant groups in the east (Beni and North Kivu), and political violence in the West. The 
BBC (2018) reported almost 1,150 acts of political violence that year.  Despite having vast 
natural resources, more than half (63%) of Congolese citizens live below the national poverty 
line of less than $1 per day (EITI 2019).  The DRC also lacks many of the basic services 
found in developed countries: the access rate to clean drinking water is 26%; the completion 
rate to the secondary level of school is 18%; the electrification rate is 6% (KPMG 2018).  The 
DRC has one of the highest infant/child and maternal mortality rates, one of the highest rates 
of malaria, and one of the highest rates of HIV/AIDS, with about 10% of the sexually active 
population impacted (KPMG 2018).  Previous armed conflicts have displaced about 2 million 
people but affected 75% of the population.  
2.2 Case study selection  
Notwithstanding these stark challenges, the DRC was selected as a case for this study 
because of its abundant cobalt resources and mining activities.  Cobalt is commonly mined as 
a byproduct of either copper or nickel mining.  The DRC has some of the highest quality 
reserves globally, with many mines having grades above 3% compared to the global average 
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of 0.6 to 0.8% (KPMG 2018). The DRC leads the world in cobalt production, is the seventh 
largest mining producer overall (for all metals and minerals) and the 8th largest producer of 
copper. The World Bank (2007) estimates that the “Copperbelt area,” mostly within the 
former Katanga province of the DRC (See Figure 1), contains an estimated 55.5 million tons 
of copper and 3.6 million tons of cobalt.  The DRC thus possesses roughly 34% of the 
world’s cobalt resources and 10% of the world’s copper resources (Crundwell et al. 2011). 
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Figure 1: The former Katanga Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
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Source: Amnesty International (2016a). 
Unusually, the DRC features two separate types of exploitable cobalt resources: 
weathered  oxide deposits near the surface, and prone to surface mining; and un-weathered 
sulfide deposits below the oxide deposits, at depths typically between 70 and 150 meters, 
prone to underground mining (Crundwell et al. 2011). This results in a fairly unusual dual 
resource system where natural or pure deposits of cobalt are mined alongside accessory or 
polluted deposits from earlier mining efforts (Cheyns et al. 2014: 313; Squadrone et al. 2016: 
679).  Due in part to this unique combination of reserves, the DRC dominates global cobalt 
production (Bazilian 2018). As Figure 2 shows, it far surpasses any other country for both 
cobalt mined and produced as well as estimated reserves. Rawles (2018) projects that DRC 
dominance will only grow in the future, anticipating that the country’s share of global cobalt 
production will rise to 75% by 2021.   
Figure 2: Global cobalt reserves and mine production  
a. Cobalt mine production from 2010 to 2018 (in tons) 
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b. Estimated cobalt reserves in 2019 
 
Source: Author, with data compiled from United States Geologic Survey 2017; Al Barazi et 
al. 2017; United States Geologic Survey 2019. 
 Because of this global dominance for cobalt, the DRC supplies metals that end up in 
some of the best-known digital and consumer products in the world.  Amnesty International 
(2016a) traced cobalt trading flows from the Katanga region and found that its minerals end 
up in the supply chains of major transnational firms including Apple, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, 
Huawei, Lenovo, LG, Microsoft, Samsung, Sony, and Vodaphone.   DRC cobalt is also an 
essential part of the supply chains for manufacturers such as Daimler AG, Volkswagen, and 
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2.3 Research design  
To collect data on mining in the DRC, this study relies on a mixed methods research 
design involving expert interviews, community interviews, naturalistic observation and site 
visits, and a literature review. 
The author first conducted 23 semi-structured expert research interviews in February to 
April 2019 at a variety of institutions involved with knowledge of mining in the DRC. This 
included:  
• Government agencies such as the Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small 
Scale Mining (SAESSCAM, recently renamed SAEMAPE) and the Ministry of Mines 
in the DRC;  
• International civil society groups such as Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural 
Resources (BGR) as well as local groups such as Resource Matters and the Carter 
Center;  
• Private sector firms and organizations including Gécamines (state-owned mining 
company), L'entreprise minière Congo Dongfang Mining (CDM mining), Tenke 
Fungurume Mining (TFM), Glencore, and Ruashi Mining;  
• Academic institutions, including the Universities of Liège in Belgium, University of 
Groningen in the Netherlands, Colorado School of Mines in the United States, 
University of Bath in the United Kingdom as well as the Université de Kinshasa and 
the Université de Lubumbashi in the DRC. 
During each interview, the author asked the following standard questions: “How would you 
describe the mining activities for copper and cobalt in the DRC? “What positive benefits and 
negative costs associated with mining have occurred?” “Who has been the most vulnerable, 
or significantly impacted?” “What policies need implemented?” Each interview lasted 
between 45 and 120 minutes, and respondents were guaranteed full anonymity to encourage 
candor and protect respondents from potential retaliation. Each participant was given a 
unique respondent number (e.g. Expert Respondent 1 to 23), referred to throughout the rest of 
the paper.  
 Given the research questions focused partly on community perceptions and impacts, 
expert interviews were coupled with community interviews throughout the Copperbelt, where 
the author met with ASM diggers (creuseurs or kwanda) and LSM miners as well as artisanal 
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bosses or chiefs, crushers, carriers, drivers, refiners, safety inspectors, sorters, labor unions 
and even members of the mining police.  In total, 48 of these community interviews were 
conducted, following the same questions or script as the expert interviews, although usually 
shorter in duration. The average community interview lasted between 10 and 45 minutes.  
Each respondent was guaranteed anonymity, and also assigned a unique respondent number 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: DRC Community Interview Participants in this Study, 2019  
Community 
Respondent 
Title Institution Location  
1 Safety 
Coordinator 












4 Digger Artisanal miner, Ruashi Lubumbashi, 
DRC 
5 Digger Artisanal miner, Ruashi Lubumbashi, 
DRC 
6 Digger and 
sorter 
Artisanal miner, Ruashi Lubumbashi, 
DRC 
7 Driver Nyati Cross Border Transport (Copper 





Kasulo Artisanal mine Kolwezi, 
DRC 
9 Digger Kasulo Artisanal mine Kolwezi, 
DRC 
10 Digger Kasulo Artisanal mine Kolwezi, 
DRC 
11 Digger Kasulo Artisanal mine Kolwezi, 
DRC 
12 Digger Kasulo Artisanal mine Kolwezi, 
DRC 
13 Digger Kasulo Artisanal mine Kolwezi, 
DRC 
14 Digger Kasulo Artisanal mine Kolwezi, 
DRC 
15 Sorter and 
carrier 
Depot 169 Kolwezi, 
DRC 
16 Sorter and 
carrier 
Depot 169 Kolwezi, 
DRC 
17 Sorter and 
carrier 
Depot 169 Kolwezi, 
DRC 
18 Carrier Depot 169 Kolwezi, 
DRC 
19 Refiner/melter Depot 2 Kolwezi, 
DRC 
20 Refiner/melter Depot 2 Kolwezi, 
DRC 
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21 Refiner/melter Depot 2 Kolwezi, 
DRC 
22 Carrier Depot 1000 Kolwezi, 
DRC 
23 Refiner/melter Depot 1000 Kolwezi, 
DRC 
24 Crusher Depot Thomas Boss Billy Kisanfu, 
DRC 
25 Sorter Depot Thomas Boss Billy Kisanfu, 
DRC 
26 Sorter and 
carrier 








Ruashi Mining (operating at TFM) Fungurume, 
DRC 
29 Manager/boss Solola and Kabica Artisanal Mines Fungurume, 
DRC 
30 Digger Solola and Kabica Artisanal Mines Fungurume, 
DRC 
31 Digger Solola and Kabica Artisanal Mines Fungurume, 
DRC 
32 Digger Solola and Kabica Artisanal Mines Fungurume, 
DRC 




Katanga and Fungurume Artisanal Mines Fungurume, 
DRC 
35 Digger Katanga and Fungurume Artisanal Mines Fungurume, 
DRC 
36 Digger Katanga and Fungurume Artisanal Mines Fungurume, 
DRC 
37 Digger Katanga and Fungurume Artisanal Mines Fungurume, 
DRC 
38 Digger Katanga and Fungurume Artisanal Mines Fungurume, 
DRC 
39 Digger Katanga and Fungurume Artisanal Mines Fungurume, 
DRC 
40 Captain Fungurume Mining Police Fungurume, 
DRC 
41 President Fungurume Mining Negotiator Association Fungurume, 
DRC 
42 Officer Fungurume Mining Police Fungurume, 
DRC 
43 Chief Depot 18 Museba, 
DRC 
44 Sorter and 
crusher 
Depot 18 Museba, 
DRC 
45 Sorter and 
crusher 
Depot 18 Museba, 
DRC 
46 Boss/manager Kawama Artisanal Mine Lubumbashi, 
DRC 
47 Digger Kawama Artisanal Mine Lubumbashi, 
DRC 
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48 Digger Kawama Artisanal Mine Lubumbashi, 
DRC 
Source: Author  
To complement the interviews, the author also conducted 30 site visits—including 1 
archive of mining documents, 11 LSM mines, 2 smelters, 10 ASM mines, 6 artisanal trading 
depots, and 1 artisanal refinery or processing center.  This included mines owned by different 
entities (Australian, Congolese, Chinese, South African, joint ventures) and locations 
(Fungurume, Kisanfu, Kolwezi, Likasi, Lubumbashi, Mulunwishi, and Museba) as well as 
active and inactive mining sites, legal and illegal sites, and sites at exploration phases but also 
production and decommissioning phases.  For readers not familiar with Congolese 
geography, Figure 2 shows the main mining communities of Fungurume, Kolwezi, Likasi, 
and Lubumbashi. Each of these naturalistic site visits lasted between 20 and 180 minutes. 
Table 2: DRC Site Visits and Naturalistic Observation Conducted in this Study, 2019 
Institution Type Description Location  




























Lualaba Copper Smelter Industrial 
smelter 
Copper smelter    Kolwezi, 
DRC 








Kasulo Artisanal mine Cobalt mine Kolwezi, 
DRC 












Depot 169 Artisanal 
refinery 
Copper and cobalt 
trader and refinery 
Kolwezi, 
DRC 
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Shituru Mining Corporation (SMCO) Industrial mine Copper mine Likasi, 
DRC 












Centre de Documentation sur le Katanga et 
les regions avoisinantes (CEDEKA) 




Gécamines copper smelter Industrial 
smelter 




L'entreprise minière Congo Dongfang 
Mining (CDM) 








Rwashi Mining Commune Industrial and 
artisanal mine 












CHEMAF Industrial Cobalt and copper Lubumbas
hi, DRC 
Depot Samy 888 Artisanal trader Copper trader Mulunwis
hi, DRC 




Source: Author  
 Figure 2: Central locations for site visits and naturalistic observation 
a. Fungurume 
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Source: Author.  
Naturalistic observation, or unstructured observation, involves what McLeod (2015: 
2) calls “studying the spontaneous behavior of participants in natural surroundings,” with the 
researcher recording what they see.  This helps supplement structured or controlled methods 
in that it enables examining behavior or events in the real world.  Key strengths of the method 
include greater validity, with highly realistic and authentic accounts being produced that can 
capture spontaneous events or reactions; little to no interviewer influence or biases of social 
desirability; and the opportunity to study a situation in its total context and complexity 
(McLeod 2015). Weaknesses include the lack of a representative sample, the reliance on a 
small (micro) scale, and inability to replicate findings (McLeod 2015).  Hence the utility of 
mixing naturalistic observation with the other two methods in the study of expert and 
community interviews.  
 For all community interviews and site visits, the author travelled with a team of 
Congolese research assistants who spoke English, French, and local languages.  The research 
team was given exceptional access as our Ordre de Mission, our permit to undertake research, 
was sponsored collectively by the University of Lubumbashi, the Congolese Ministry of 
Education, both the provincial governors of Haut-Katanga (home to the mines in Likasi and 
Lubumbashi) and Lualaba (home to the mines in Kolwezi and Fungurume), and the 
Congolese Secret Service.  Our team also included a justice advocate, a Congolese lawyer, to 
enhance the legitimacy of the visit, but also minimize opportunities for corruption. 
To triangulate the data from the interviews and site visits, and also to better position it 
within the body of growing research, the author lastly conducted an interdisciplinary 
literature review of studies looking at copper and cobalt mining in the DRC, especially in the 
former Katanga province, published within the past ten years (i.e., from 2010 to 2019).  The 
Scopus and Science Direct databases were searched for terms such as “copper,” “cobalt,” 
“mining” and “extractive industries” as well as phrases such as “Congo,” “Lubumbashi,” and 
“Kolwezi.”  Because only a small number of actual peer reviewed studies (about a dozen) 
were collected, the author repeated the search for non-academic sources including reports, 
policy briefs, and magazine and newspaper articles. The resulting corpus of approximately 
fifty studies is cited throughout this study to help situate or confirm its findings within the 
literature.  
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3. Contours of the DRC’s cobalt mining “boom” 
This section discusses the contours of cobalt mining, before describing ASM and 
LSM activities in the DRC. Cobalt primarily is mined as a byproduct of nickel and copper 
mining, with only about 2 percent of global cobalt production coming from mines where 
cobalt is the primary commodity (Al Barazi et al. 2017)—the rest is where cobalt is mined as 
a secondary metal.  In the DRC cobalt is found in five different types of deposits (Tsurukawa 
et al. 2011). Some cobalt occurs as primary stratiform deposits of sulfides such as Carollite.  
Some cobalt is in vein-like deposits along tectonic plates. Some cobalt exists in caps. Some 
exists in scree deposits or “black earth” concentrated in the bottom of valleys. And some 
exists in tailings from earlier copper mining.  Most cobalt in the DRC is extracted in raw 
form from one of these five sources, before it is processed into refined cobalt hydroxide or 
cobalt carbonate.  
3.1 A brief history of cobalt mining in the DRC 
Cobalt mining in the DRC has a rich history, one that dates to colonial times when the 
Belgians treated it as a source of cheap food, labor, and land (Honke 2010).  Expert 
Respondent 3 explained the colonial history of the DRC in these terms: 
I have always been struck by the fact that the environmental problems in the DRC can 
be traced to European origins. It made Belgium very rich during colonial times, as it 
had a monopoly on mining in Katanga.  Those mines extracted copper, cobalt, and 
uranium, the latter even being used in the Manhattan project for the first atomic 
bombs. The Copperbelt has been called the “geological scandal” because it is so rich 
in metals, they have almost the entire table of Mendeleev there.  
Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), a consortium under Belgian control, was 
nationalized following Congolese independence in 1960 and the Katangan secession in 1963. 
The parastatal company Gécamines S.A. took control over operations in 1967, expanding the 
mining of copper and cobalt and also further establishing smelters, many of which existed 
before the 1960s (Prasad 1989).  During the 1970s and 1980s, Gécamines was the world’s 
largest cobalt and fourth largest copper producer, with a historical peak in production in 1986 
(Al Barazi et al. 2017).  
However, things started to deteriorate in the 1990s, largely due to alleged corruption 
and embezzlement within the company (Tsurukawa et al. 2011). In 1992 the provincial 
governor, seeking to promote entrepreneurship in the trade of metals and metal scraps, 
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launched “Opération Mitraille,” but this turned into a “disaster” for the region as people sold 
whatever metals they could find (including cables and rail) to Lebanese and Indian traders 
(Tsurukawa et al. 2011). At the same time, Gécamines staff appropriated large amounts of 
copper and cobalt in the context of unpaid salaries and rivalry between different social 
groups.  
The first Congolese War in 1996 and 1997 only worsened the situation, as the 
resources were ceded to Laurent Desire Kabila who sought to privatize concessions to gain 
support with the international community to overthrow the Mobutu regime. This was 
followed by a second war in which forces in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda sought to 
overthrow Kabila from 1998 to 2003 (Amnesty International 2016a). Amidst all of the chaos, 
industrial cobalt production deteriorated (reaching all-time lows in the 1990s) and ASM 
mining accelerated to fill the gap. Kabila further encouraged ASM miners to dig for 
themselves in Gécamines concessions. The World Bank (2007) estimated that during the 
1990s, Gécamines was so mismanaged and inefficient that its capacity utilization was less 
than 10%, and that it had accrued external debts of approximately $2.5 billion.   
In 1999, however, Kabila changed tactics and established a government agency to 
regulate, and tax, this growing mining sector as a vital source of revenue. The Service 
d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining (SAESSCAM) was established to 
oversee artisanal mining, and from then onward mining took off. Expert Respondent 1 
explains that: 
The 1990s saw ASM expand significantly throughout Katanga.  Tens of thousands of 
miners went into open pits, dug through tailings, sometimes they made their own 
surface pits. During this first, surface ore, often viewed by miners as the cherry on top 
of the cake, was almost entirely harvested.  You can finance your mining project by 
selling this ore, as it was often found with 30-40% carbonite, very high. At the 
beginning, these were exported to Zambia to process plants there, across the border, 
usually concentrated and exported through to Durban, South Africa. A trade network 
evolved, with quite a few political leaders involved.  This made cobalt and copper a 
political lifeline. Very quickly, you saw new mining sites emerge in Lubumbashi and 
Kolwezi, initially supported by local Greek and Indian businesspersons, later by the 
Chinese.   
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“This boom,” Expert Respondent 1 stated, “ended in the early 2000s, coinciding with the 
assassination of Kabila in 2001.” 
After that assassination, his son Joseph Kabila was designated President and began a 
series of major reforms to open up the Congolese economy to foreign investors, in exchange 
for new loans. In 2002, the government published a new Mining Code in an attempt to revive 
the sector and attract foreign investment. The Mining Code established that artisanal mining 
can only take place within authorized Zones d’exploitation artisanale (Artisanal Mining 
Zones or ZEAs) where industrial or semi-industrial mining is not viable. Artisanal miners 
were forcefully driven out of many mining sites which were made available to major western 
and Chinese companies; moreover, very few ZEAs were actually given licenses (Higgs 
2017). Expert Respondent 2 believes that the new Mining Code “stifled almost entirely ASM 
activities” and transferred what were “essentially public resources into the hands of private 
firms and joint ventures, many linked to the President himself.”  
Then, in 2003, Gécamines was restructured so that roughly half the workforce, more 
than 10,600 employees, immediately lost their jobs—with many of the unemployed joining 
the already ballooning ASM sector. Expert Respondent 15 reflected on how this was 
“devastating” for the region, given that Gécamines was “a vital part of local economy and it 
was dismantled and broken apart in a very damaging way to our society and community. All 
of Lubumbashi was linked to the good working of Gecamines, so the financial catastrophe 
was felt in every home.” 
After the end of the second Congolese war, and the reunification of the country over 
2003 to 2005, and Kabila’s reelection in 2006, further reforms to the mining sector were 
implemented, transferring more concessions to foreign companies and making many ASM 
operations illegal.  The year 2007 saw 29 joint ventures and privatization contracts issued, 
and 2008 marked a landmark “Sino-Congolese Cooperation Agreement” under which state-
owned Chinese companies invested $6 billion in infrastructure and $3.25 billion in 
Sicomines, a joint venture between Gécamines and a consortium of Chinese companies with 
rights to copper and cobalt reserves.  Very recently, in 2018, a newer Mining Code came into 
force, one that attempted to encourage more mandatory corporate social responsibility and 
redistribution of taxes between national and local governments. Expert Respondent 14 
however cautions that “it is far too early to tell if this reform is being enforced or will have 
any lasting impact.” 
The political economy of cobalt 19 
 
Despite the major push towards privatization and formalization, the current state of 
mining in the DRC sees both ASM and LSM operations uncomfortably coexisting.   
3.2 Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) practices 
 ASM mining is formally defined by Congolese law as “people carrying out extraction 
and concentration of mineral substances, using artisanal tools, methods and processes” 
(Tsurukawa et al. 2011).  Other terms used for ASM mining include “semi-industrial” or just 
“small-scale.”  ASM cobalt mining in the DRC generally takes two forms, both of which 
involve “mining by bare hand” (Amnesty International 2016a). One is where miners, 
typically adult men, work to dig underground tunnels with shovels, chisels, and mallets as far 
as 30 meters deep. They mine copper and cobalt beneath the surface.  As Expert Respondent 
1 explained: 
Artisanal miners will usually dig five to fifteen meter deep pits. At the bottom of the 
shaft they will dig a “living room,” where people sit, then “galleries” going 
horizontally where they extract the ore in teams of four to five men—more simply 
cannot fit inside the mine.  It takes months of backbreaking work to build the shaft to 
reach the ore, at least four or eight weeks.  Usually the ore is sorted and washed by 
women and children at the outskirts of the mining site. Then it is sold to traders or 
directly to buying houses, mainly owned by foreigners.  The second type of mining is 
much less organized. It is where some men, but mostly women and children, collect 
and dig for cobalt in discarded tailings and slurry close to or even on LSM or 
industrial sites.    
Expert Respondent 3 added that “the uniqueness of cobalt in Katanga is it is fairly shallow, it 
is amenable to artisanal mining, people don’t have to dig as deep for other minerals. The 
extraction technology can be low-level, low-tech, just a shovel, pick axes, and buckets. I have 
not seen anything that was mechanical, except to sharpen blades.”   A typical ASM worker 
earns $1 to $3 per day and produces 30 to 50 kilograms of raw ore per day.  Many times, 
diggers are pre-financed by a négociant (merchant or dealer) who sets terms, including 
interest and price, before mining commences.  Figure 3 shows four of the ASM sites visited 
by the author, two of the “digging pit” type and two of the “slurry and tailings type.” 
 Figure 3: Four ASM sites in Katanga, Democratic Republic of the Congo, March 2019  
a. Kolwezi, on the backside of the Sicomines concession  
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b. Kasulo, underneath Kasulo village  
 
c. Kawama, on the backside of a CDM concession  
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d. Rwashi, on the backside of the CHEMAF concession 
 
Source: Author, with permission granted by each community to be photographed.  
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Even in 2015, with all of the push for LSM, ASM produced more cobalt than any 
other single large mine (see Figure 4). Nonetheless, contrary to this sizable level of 
production, output per individual miner or mine is low, even though collectively ASM 
accounts for 20% of national supply (Al Barazi et al. 2017), and thus 12.9% of global supply.   
Lindberg and Andersson (2019) note that many miners are so poor, they cannot even afford a 
ladder, merely digging extra steps into a pit; they almost never wear a helmet or protective 
equipment; and in some cases they lack even shovels or hammers and dig by hand. 
Figure 4: Cobalt mine production in the DRC by source from 2009 to 2015  
 
Source: Al Barazi et al. (2017) 
 Given both its questionable legal status and seasonal fluctuations by calendar year and 
price, a range of estimates exists for the number of people involved in ASM practices. 
Amnesty International (2016a) estimated that 100,000 regular artisanal miners operated in 
Katanga, rising to about 150,000 on a seasonal basis.  Tsurukawa et al. (2011) also estimated 
that 67,000 to 79,000 ASM miners were working full time with a seasonal peak of 90,000 to 
108,000 miners (see Table 3). They calculated that about three-quarters (74%) of the 
workforce is diggers with the rest mostly sorters and washers. In terms of market value at this 
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time, Tsurukawa et al. (2011) estimated that ASM’s contribution to the national economy 
was between $149 million and $324 million, or as much as 2.4% of national GDP.  The 
number of ASM miners are comparable in the size of the workforce to those working in the 
“conflict minerals” sector in the Eastern Congo, notably South Kivu and North Kivu, where 
they mine gold and 3T (tin, tantalum, and tungsten ores).   Across the entire DRC, the World 
Bank (2008) estimated that the ASM was the “most important” segment of the mining sector 
because it involved 10 million people or 16% of the DRC’s population.  Before the second 
Congolese war, about 90% of all cobalt mining was done using ASM techniques, though now 
this number has dropped to between 15 to 20%.   PACT (2012: 2) similarly suggested that 
ASM was the “most important segment of the mining sector” and that up to 20% of the 
population depends on ASM mining in some form.  Expert Respondent 5 estimated that “we 
have trouble getting the numbers right, but my guess is in Katanga we have between 50,000 
and 200,000 people working in the ASM sector, compared to only 3,000 people for LSM 
cobalt mines.” 
Table 3: Estimated number of ASM miners in the Katanga Copperbelt  
 Permanent Peak season 

























Source: Tsurukawa et al. (2011) 
  
3.3 Large scale and industrial mining (LSM) practices  
 LSM mining contrasts sharply, in scope and scale, to ASM. Industrial techniques 
utilize much larger machinery and a high degree of mechanization and automation, usually 
using a mix of surface scrapers, bulldozers, and diggers (Crundwell et al. 2011). Expert 
Respondent 1 described industrial mining as follows; 
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Today, at least 13 true industrial scale mining projects are in the phase of production 
in the Katanga region, many privately listed companies.  These new mines are all 
mechanized and more automated so not as many jobs as predicted, but 1 million tons 
of copper production exist compared to before the boom (460,000 tons).  
Community Respondent 27, an industrial miner, added that: 
Much of the Congolese industrial mining is similar to other countries. It has a large 
number of specialized firms and contractors, with international safety standards. It 
involves excavators, dump trucks, mechanical equipment, and even some automation.  
We drill and blast with dynamite. We all have protective equipment such as dust 
masks or respirators, and the drilling and blasting teams are extremely safe. Perhaps 
the only unusual thing is the intensity of the shifts—we work 12 hour shifts, and we do 
24-7 mining, so it never stops.   
Figure 5 shows five industrial mining sites visited by the author, one of them, the TFM mine, 
so big its concession covers about 1,500 square kilometers, though current mining efforts are 
concentrated in a few isolated zones. A list of registered domestic and foreign LSM mining 
companies in the DRC is offered in Appendix I (KPMG 2018). 
Figure 5: Five LSM industrial sites in Katanga, March, 2019  
a. The CDM mine in Lubumbashi  
 
b. The CHEMAF mine in Lubumbashi  
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c. The Rwashi mine in Lubumbashi 
 
d. Sicomines in Kolwezi 
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e. Tenke Fugurume Mine in Fugurume  
 
Source: Author.  
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4. Highlighting the ostensible benefits of mining in the DRC  
 Notwithstanding some daunting challenges discussed in the next section, cobalt 
mining as a whole has brought some discernable benefits to local communities and the state.  
As Expert Respondent 16 explained, these benefits are diffuse:  
The cobalt mining boom has been key in the DRC to jobs and escaping poverty, 
creating a new middle class. Responsible mining has built schools and hospitals that 
would not otherwise be there, reaching thousands of people, and it has promoted the 
much needed image abroad that the DRC is safer for foreign investment.  
This section discusses six interrelated and inductively identified benefits to cobalt mining: 
poverty reduction, community development, regional stability, ancillary markets, state 
revenue, and a strong social and cultural identity.  
4.1 An economic lifeline out of poverty   
 The first, most direct, and repeatedly mentioned benefit to mining was its ability to 
offer jobs and alleviate poverty.  Expert Respondent 1 commented that “artisanal mines offer 
employment to tens of thousands of people, especially during the dry season, mainly young 
men and a few women and children, and it offers incomes as high as $30 to $50 per month, 
which is high for the region.”  Expert Respondent 12 stated that the mission of the 
government was to use mining revenues to “target, guide, and assist in the creation of a new 
social middle class of miners.”   
Many of the miners themselves the author spoke to talked about the benefits of their 
work.  Community Respondent 30, a digger, noted that “it’s not easy to find any other job.” 
Community Respondent 31, another digger, agreed and noted that “we have to go into the 
mines because we need money.” Community Respondent 34 framed the necessity of mining 
in terms of learning and investment in skills, commenting that: 
We dig everywhere we can, from Lubumbashi to Kolwezi, even into Zambia.  By bus. 
Then we take bicycles and motorcycles to the mine.  We need a hovel, a pickaxe, some 
other basic tools. These are heavy and expensive, it requires a substantial investment 
to get started, at least 1-2 weeks wages. 
Community Respondent 38 added that “there is no other job for me to have. There are no 
other good jobs, this is the best one there is.  Without it, I would have nothing.” Expert 
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Respondent 22 noted that “Even at the bottom of the ladder, literally and figuratively, ASM 
miners still have the best paid jobs they can get in their community.” 
 This ability for ASM mining to provide a lifeline to those in poverty has been noted in 
the peer-reviewed literature.  Miners in sub-Saharan Africa essentially believe that mining is 
what Fisher et al. (2009) term the “ladder that sends them to wealth.”  Tsurukawa et al. 
(2011) note that because widespread poverty affects the entire population in the DRC, whole 
families can become involved in ASM; you will also even see unpaid state agents or 
university teachers digging for ore alongside migrants or former soldiers. (Two respondents 
noted their local priest was also a cobalt miner). Faber et al. (2017) found that Congolese 
households in ASM communities are indeed on average poorer and more vulnerable to 
income shocks than other groups, with 60% of households in poverty reporting relying on 
mining for their livelihoods.  Mining however enables those households to earn about $35 per 
month.1  
4.2 Community development 
 A second benefit relates to the community development impacts that mining 
enterprises bring. Expert Respondent 4 noted that, due mostly to mining companies, “massive 
investments in infrastructure and economic development have occurred, and they have 
transformed the region into a modern site of industrial activity.” Expert Respondent 1 
credited LSM with bringing “roads, shops, malls, and better housing;” Expert Respondent 5 
emphasized the “jobs, schools, public services, and health stations” mining operations bring; 
Expert Respondent 14 that mining companies offer “drilling wells for water supply, 
playgrounds, and even libraries.”   Other respondents mentioned how ASM operations 
generated income for paying school fees, or improving community food security. 
Granted, these benefits are highly dependent on the type of mining firm and the extent 
to which it promotes good governance and community empowerment.  One respondent noted 
that such foreign firms can adhere to stronger standards concerning human rights or labor. As 
Expert Respondent 22 stated, “multinationals are vigilant and take a no tolerance policy 
towards child labor.”  Honke (2010) describes this process of LSM creating “bubbles of 
company governance” where mining companies provide everything themselves, including 
security, transport, living quarters, even water, food, health care and education. Indeed, 
                                                 
1 Note, however, that section 5 does contest some of these economic dimensions, or at least places them in 
perspective.  Section 5 also notes the issue of food insecurity that possibly results from the diversion of workers 
from agriculture to mining. 
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Figure 6 shows multiple community assets built exclusively by the TFM mine in Fungurume, 
including two schools, two water pumps, and a club for youth. 
Figure 6: Community infrastructure developed by the TFM mining company in 
Fungurume, March 2019 
a. A primary school  
 
b. A drinking water station  
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c. An elementary school 
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d. A water well 
 
e. A social club for youth 
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Source: Author  
4.3 Opportunity for migrants and refugees and regional stability  
 A third important benefit relates to regional stability, and especially the safety and 
protection of migrants and refugees. Expert Respondent 6 added that “artisanal mining 
provides livelihoods and revenue to some of the poorest families in the Congo, which is one 
of the poorest countries in the world, who have lived through war, strife, and continual 
conflict. Refugees and migrants are unskilled, so what else can they do?”  Expert Respondent 
14 emphasized how ASM mining provided a “lifeline” for some of the most vulnerable in the 
DRC, especially “refugees feeling conflict as well as orphans.” The World Bank (2007) 
confirmed this was the case in their research, noting that mining provided a safe haven for 
millions of internally displaced persons fleeing two wars, foreign army invasions and 
occupations, militia activity, and ethnic conflict.  
 Correlated with creating a safe space and the creation of a middle class is a political 
benefit of being one of the best governed provinces in the country. Expert Respondent 14 
praised mining for brining “political stabilization.” As they continued: 
Because of its mineral wealth, this province Katanga (now four provinces of Haut-
Katanga, Lualaba, Haut-Lomami, and Tanganyika) is the best governed in the entire 
country. It is the safest, richest, and most stable. 
Expert Respondent 7 said that they thought that the Katanga region was “the best governed in 
the country, the best run and the place with the most opportunity.” Expert Respondent 22 
remarked that “mining has made Katanga the most prosperous and stable part of the entire 
country.” 
4.4 Ancillary benefits, markets and services  
 A fourth benefit referred to the rich secondary markets and ancillary services that 
mining opens up. Expert Respondent 11 commented that “mining creates secondary 
spillovers, everything from trading depots and refineries, to shops selling food and water to 
miners.” Figure 7 for instance shows such shops around Fungurume. Expert Respondent 13 
noted how in Kolwezi, LSM mining has generated large amounts of rock and sand that are 
used by the community as a byproduct to make cement.  As they noted, “mining is a magnet 
for other economic activity.”  Expert Respondent 9 estimated that trade in Katanga for 
shovels and sacks alone was a $1 million annual enterprise.  
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Figure 7: Secondary markets and ancillary services for mining in Katanga, DRC, 
March 2019 
a. Sand mining on the Sicomines concession  
 
b. Utilization of Sicomines sand to make cement 
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c. Trading depots near Fungurume  
 
d. Shovels and mining tools for sale  
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e. Food markets around the TFM mine in Fungurume  
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Source: Author, with permission granted by each community to be photographed. 
4.5 State revenue and economic growth 
 In tandem with these benefits, mining has provided strong regional growth and 
significant state revenue.2  Expert Respondent 6 remarked that “cobalt mining in the Congo 
results in positives at the macro level such as foreign exchange, high royalties, and fiscal 
revenue.”  Expert Respondent 8 emphasized that a benefit to mining was “technology transfer 
development as well as a form of linking to international trade and markets.” Expert 
Respondent 11 suggested that “the future of the DRC state rests on mining.”   
The World Bank (2008) affirmed many of these statements, calling mining the 
“engine of the Congo economy” and projecting under a base case scenario that the mining 
sector generates $186 million to $388 million in gross production value every year. This 
means mining as a whole contributes 97.5% to national exports, 20% to national GDP, 24.7% 
to government revenue, and 23.9 % to formal employment (EITI 2019).  Reuters (2019) also 
reported that the mining sector as a whole paid $1.57 billion in revenues to the government in 
                                                 
2 Although aspects of this are problematized in Section 5 below, especially concerning corruption. 
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2018, and that this amount almost doubled (up 91%) from the previous year.  This amount 
may only scratch the surface, with Higgs (2017) speculating that the DRC could have $214 
trillion in untapped mineral resources. 
4.6 Social and cultural identity 
 A final, more prosaic but nonetheless salient benefit to mining is its contribution to 
creating a strong sense of social and cultural identity. Expert Respondent 2 explained that 
“many Congolese are proud to be miners, or proud that the country leads the world in 
something.” Tsurukawa et al. (2011) found this to be true in their own research, noting that 
many ASM and LSM miners find their job highly satisfying, and that the government and 
private sector alike envision mining as contributing critically to sustainable development.  
Cuvelier’s (2014, 2017) ethnographic work with mining communities in Katanga also 
confirms how mining becomes a part of household and personal identity.  
5. Revealing the mounting risks of mining in the DRC 
The benefits of mining, while real, sit starkly in contrast to six mounting risks:  
accidents and occupational hazards, environmental pollution and degraded community health, 
exploitation of miners and unfair market practices, the erosion of democracy via corruption 
and malfeasance, displacement of indigenous peoples, and in the extreme violent conflict.  
5.1 Accidents and occupational hazards  
The first potent risk refers to fatal accidents and landslides inside mines, especially 
ASM shafts, as well as occupational exposure to dust and other medical ailments from ASM 
and LSM operations.  Expert Respondent 21 explained that: 
ASM mining for cobalt and copper is some of the most dangerous in the world. It’s 
not like gems, which are embedded in rock and can be extracted fairly easily without 
risking mine collapse. It’s not like gold, which is mined in seams no more than a 
meter or so in depth, meaning you mine around the seam. No, copper and cobalt 
mining is like removing entire blocks at a time, excavating an entire shaft of a mine so 
that’s as big as a bus or small assembly hall.  Then it falls in on you. 
Expert Respondent 7 underscored the occupational vulnerability of miners as follows: 
Artisanal miners work in terrible conditions.  They are at the bottom end of the 
mining industry, in every imaginable way. There are no trade unions to defend their 
rights, no specific cooperatives that try to improve conditions. Too many important 
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political individuals profit from the mining industry being as it is, to make it safer.  
The labor conditions within ASM are poor, dangerous, hazardous, and horrific.    
Expert Respondent 14 added that “most ASM operations are poorly managed societies, 
enterprises with just one boss and a few workers. The boss is the biggest beneficiary, and he 
treats his workers or cooperatives members quite badly. There is nonexistent health and 
safety training, and an absolute lack of willingness and knowledge to make things better.”   
 Interviews with the miners themselves brought these concerns to the forefront.  
Community Respondent 9 stated that “The danger is always the wall. You never know when 
rocks will fall or the mine will collapse. So far my team has been lucky, but I don’t know how 
long that luck will last.  I have nightmares when I sleep about that wall trapping me, crushing 
me.”  Community Respondent 29 noted that he always “felt sick and scared of accidents. One 
of my diggers was in a hole, and a stone fell and crushed him. He lost both his legs.”  
Community Respondent 36 talked about how “I know of many friends involved in accidents.  
We have avoided them on our team but not because we are better or worse, we are more or 
less careful, have better or worse equipment. We have just been lucky, that is all, and some 
day our luck may change.”   Community Respondent 37 mentioned that they “breathe dust 
all the time, and have a cough that won’t go away.” Indeed, Figure 8 shows portraits of four 
ASM miners the author interviewed, all with coughs, possible signs of silicosis, and all with 
red eyes from dust. 
Figure 8: Four ASM miners in the Fungurume and Kolwezi region of Katanga, March, 
2019 
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Source: Author, with permission granted by each miner to be photographed.  
 It is not just miners, either, who face occupational hazards.  Community Respondent 
46, who worked at a cobalt depot, talked about the hazardous nature of transport. They said 
“To get here to the depot, if I put a sack of cobalt on my bicycle, it is too heavy to pedal.  It 
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must be pushed like a wheelbarrow. When that happens, it can take 8 to 12 hours just to 
reach the destination, even traveling at night, and you have to dodge the trucks, buses, and 
traffic.” The author would note that when they picked up a single sack of cobalt, half full, 
they could barely lift it. (Such sacks are often as heavy as 70 kilograms).  Community 
Respondent 47 also spoke of transport safety commenting that “many children or young 
adults do get run over by fast moving buses or trucks on the highway. Others are robbed, or 
disappear.” 
 Still others discussed the hazards of sorting, processing, and crushing cobalt ore. 
Community Respondent 43 mentioned that: 
After ASM miners deliver sacks of cobalt via motorcycle, car, bicycle, and sometimes 
on foot, we take their name, and ensure they are registered.  Second, we check their 
product, and separate the rocks inside.  Green blue is copper, cobalt is dark brown 
and grey.  Third, we threat the product chemically before we pass it to our Chinese 
boss, who ensures it is taken to Lubumbashi. But this is backbreaking work, and after 
we are done each day our bodies are tired and hurt everywhere. 
In this way, other parts of the cobalt supply chain can pose occupational dangers.   
 Some respondents discussed how mining places entire communities at risk.  Expert 
Respondent 4 explained that:  
Proximity is the problem.  People migrate and settle literally on top of the mine. When 
landslides happen, homes and walls crack and fall apart, people are injured by 
projectiles. 
During our visit to Kasulo, multiple respondents discussed how after the community 
discovered cobalt below homes, they tore them up to get at it, even causing a major landslide 
that killed dozens. They dug in gardens, inside homes, inside streets, inside backyards. Figure 
9 for example shows a collapsed road from that landslide.  Lindberg and Andersson (2019) 
write about how when they visited Kasulo, they were told the local pastor broke up a large 
hole in the church floor to mine for cobalt, thinking he would strike it rich.  
Figure 9: Landslides and collapsed roads caused by ASM in Kasulo, March, 2019  
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Source: Author  
 Many of these health and occupational hazards are confirmed in the literature.  
Amnesty International (2016a) does note that ASM accidents are “common” and that 
unsupported tunnels collapse “frequently.”  Further complicating matters, many accidents go 
unreported and bodies, and in some cases entire mining teams, are merely buried 
underground. At least 80 miners died in accidents between September 2014 and December 
2015, with many being buried alive after heavy rains (Amnesty International 2016b). 
Tsurukawa et al. (2011) calculated that annual death rates for the ASM sector range to 
between 0.4 to 0.5% of the workforce—or if one goes with the number of 100,000 miners, 
400 to 500 deaths per year. They added that the danger of landslides is permanent; that the 
risk of accidents increases during the rainy season; and that other than being buried alive, 
many accidents also lead to suffocation or drowning. Hinton et al. (2013) note that other 
constant dangers to ASM mining include chemical poisoning from mercury and cyanide 
(especially for gold mining), methane and coal dust explosions, electrocution and death 
through the inappropriate use of underground explosives and resulting fires and explosions.  
Hinton et al. (2013) add that even though ASM accidents are systematically underreported, 
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the data that does exist suggests that ASM mining is still six to seven times more likely to 
have accidents than LSM operations.  Elenge et al. (2013) report that in one particular part of 
Katanga, Lupoto, 392 accidents at ASM occurred in one year, affecting 72.2% of miners.  
Elenge et al. (2011) described how diggers face the ever-present risk of mine collapse, 
suffocation, dehydration, and polluted air; crushers face the chronic risks of ocular 
traumatism (vision loss and eye damage); loaders face exposure to handling heavy loads.  
The World Bank (2007) writes that “the welfare and labor conditions of virtually all ASM 
mines is appalling and miners are generally completely ignorant about basic occupational 
health and safety, with many injuries and fatal accidents … Most incidents are caused by; 
widespread appalling and unsafe working conditions, and exposure to mercury (orpaillage 
activity), dust, fumes, rock falls, landslides, underground stope collapses and ground failure. 
There are also the effects of poor ventilation and lighting, over exertion and inadequate work 
space.” 
5.2 Environmental pollution and degraded health  
 A second immediate and localized impact to both types mining are its negative impact 
on the natural environment, with deleterious consequences on public health.  This came up 
repeatedly in our interviews as well as the peer reviewed literature.   
For example, Expert Respondent 1 noted that: 
Cobalt mining brings severe environmental impacts, pollution of the rivers and the 
soil and even of the people. You have multiple pollution streams: pollution of the 
vegetables and farms. Pollution through dust.  Pollution through the air.  High levels 
of cobalt are in the urine and blood of mining workers and in entire mining 
communities.  This is alarming for the children, women, and young men.  Pollution is 
quite obvious when you arrive in Lubumbashi, you can taste it in your mouth. 
Hundreds of trucks drive around or through the city center arrive every day, adding 
to the dust.  Another big unknown is the impact of uranium, which spreads 
radioactive tailings across multiple sites … Looking at the mining environment feels 
like being on the moon. Tailings are everywhere, rocky barren landscapes dominate 
the view, devoid of life.   
Expert Respondent 6 called mining activities “quite devastating to local ecology.”  
Community Respondent 28, an industrial miner, framed it by commenting that:  
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The industrial mining process for copper and cobalt here essentially ravages the 
environment. It is almost identical to the mountain top removal processes for coal in 
the United States, except without the environmental standards and we use more acid. 
We blast apart whole mountains and forests, and generate massive amounts of waste, 
tailings, and slurry that gets dumped into the wilderness, or as is often the case, next 
to communities and the miners themselves. 
Indeed, Figure 10 shows the presence of acid, dust, and tailings witnessed during the field 
research. Some, like the Kasulo ASM, are literally in the backyards of homes, next to drying 
laundry or food storage.  
Figure 10: Environmental calamities with cobalt mining in the DRC, March 2019  
a. Shipments of acid near Fungurume for the TFM mine  
 
b. Mine dust near the CDM mine in Lubumbashi  
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c. Tailings from the Kawama ASM 
 
d. Tailings from the Kasulo ASM 




 Numerous articles have confirmed the depth and extent of environmental pollution 
with cobalt mining. Banza Lubaba Nkulu et al. (2018) write that mining dust containing 
cobalt and other metals, including uranium, can be inhaled into the lungs and ingested 
through contamination of food and other items, especially by children.  Lindberg and 
Andersson (2019) collected measurements of cobalt and metals in soil, and found it exceeded 
the Swedish safety limit by more than 100 times. Tsurukawa et al. (2011) add that mining 
also affects water quality and availability, with many minerals washed in local rivers that are 
also routinely used for cooking, bathing, and drinking.  They also noted that radiation dose 
rates near piles of ore, even at depots, often exceed international standards for radiation 
workers. The World Bank (2008) called the environmental impacts of mining in the DRC 
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“deplorable.”   In a special report on ASM, the World Bank (2007: 10) suggested that the 
environmental impacts from ASM mining cut across: 
• Biodiversity loss and the destruction of natural habitats through mines and disposal 
sites; 
• Air pollution through emissions and discharges; 
• Siltation of wetlands and riparian areas from processing slimes; 
• Changes in river ecology due to pollution, sedimentation, and flow modification; 
• Deforestation; 
• Soil erosion; 
• Land instability and ground subsidence.  
Thus, the World Bank (2007: 10) concluded that ASM as a whole was “virtually always 
environmentally destructive as the sector operates in a clandestine manner with little regard 
or respect for the local environment or ecosystems; resulting in the direct dumping of waste, 
tailings, effluents, river damage in alluvial areas, mercury pollution, land degradation and soil 
erosion, deforestation, and the loss of biodiversity.”  
 These activities not only damage the environment, they threaten public health. Sadly, 
the impacts are not limited to miners or even mining sites. Banza Lubaba Nkulu et al. (2018) 
collected blood and urine samples from 72 residents of the Kasulo ASM, including 32 
children, and noted that “children living in the mining district had ten times as much cobalt in 
their urine as children living elsewhere.”  They found more DNA damage in children in the 
mining area than in a control group.  Kayembe-Kitenge et al. (2017) report a higher risk of 
congenital birth defects.  Amnesty International (2016a) warned how chronic exposure to 
cobalt dust leads to a potentially fatal lung disease, called “hard metal lung disease.” 
Inhalation of cobalt particles can also cause “respiratory sensitization, asthma, shortness of 
breath, and decreased pulmonary function”, and sustained skin contact with cobalt can lead to 
dermatitis. One woman who said she carried 50 kg sacks of cobalt ore told Amnesty 
International (2016a) that “We all have problems with our lungs, and pain all over our 
bodies.” Banza Lubaba Nkulu et al. (2009) used biomonitoring to document that those merely 
living close to mines in the DRC had elevated levels of copper and uranium in urine as well 
as “significantly higher” concentrations of cadmium, copper, cobalt, and uranium in the 
blood. As the study concluded, “The extremely high levels for cobalt and the high levels of 
other toxic metals in the urine of these subjects from the general population of Katanga 
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confirm that they are significantly exposed to these metals through their environment.”   
Nemery et al. (2018) also confirmed the presence of other trace metals such as uranium, 
manganese, lead or mercury in urine or blood, depending on the type of jobs.  Squadrone et 
al. (2016) documented that the severe contamination of lakes and rivers where cobalt is 
washed, and where slurry and runoff flows, such as Lake Tshangalele, enters community 
food supplies and staples as people rely on fish to eat, or those water sources for drinking 
water.  
 A final link to health concerns not environmental degradation, but the spread of 
disease in mining camps.  Tsurukawa et al. (2011) write that mining camps—for both ASM 
and LSM—often lack sanitation and hygiene, and they feature frequent prostitution or 
promiscuity that further spread sexual infections or HIV/AIDS.   The World Bank (2007) 
confirmed “deteriorating health conditions” in mining camps and noted that they both lack 
public health facilities and are ideal sites for where malaria and other parasitic and 
communicable diseases related to poor sanitation, such as cholera, dysentery, diarrhea, and 
tuberculosis, are spread.  
5.3 Exploitation and unfair market practices  
 Miners face not only the risk of accidents or contributing to environmental pollution 
that poison them. They are also exploited by their bosses, by trading companies, and by other 
actors involved in the political economy of cobalt.  These features are only exacerbated by an 
extremely volatile price for cobalt, which was trading at $30,000 per ton in early 2019 but 
had reached an all-time high of $95,250 per ton in March of 2018 and a low of $21,750 in 
February 2016, as Figure 10 indicates. 
Figure 10: Global prices for cobalt (US$ per ton), 2014-2018  
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Source: Trading Economics (2019).  
Multiple miners discussed being taken advantage of by either the bosses they worked 
for, the companies they sold cobalt to, or LSM operations that artificially depressed the price 
of cobalt.  Community Respondent 8 said: 
I am very angry about CDM and other concessions.  Since they have come, my 
livelihood and my family suffer. The price for cobalt is too low, and CDM pays less 
than market prices, which hurts us even more because we cannot compete with them 
on an open market. We are displaced and undercut with prices at the same time. 
Community Respondent 29 confirmed this and noted: 
When we go and sell cobalt, we run into problems. We do not get a fair or normal 
market price, always we are undercut by the industrial firms, and the prices are 
always low below the proper price. We are all parents, we have to support our 
children, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to do so. 
Community Respondent 39 talked about “double taxation” and added that “we can never get 
enough money, the mining police always taking a share of my cut, then hen we have to sell 
below market prices anyways.” Community Respondent 46 spoke again of prices being too 
low, so low that the traders now exploit the diggers and pay only for the copper, demanding 
the cobalt is “free” as a tax. Community Respondent 44 explained that currently (as of March 
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2019), the depots say they “don’t want cobalt, copper is more profitable, I give them cobalt 
for free.”  
 Indeed, the author saw more than 200 depots during the field research, from literally 
“Depot AAA” to “Depot Z” as well as many ones in between. Some had the names of bosses, 
“Depot Jeef” and “Depot Kenedy,” some were intended to be lucky e.g. “Depot 888” and 
“Depot Number One”, others were just odd, such as “Depot Vice Versa” and our favorite 
“Depot Boss Billy.” All of these, however, existed to try and collect ASM cobalt and at times 
take advantage of miners. Banza Lubaba Nkulu et al. (2018) reported that ASM miners sell 
their raw metals to Chinese, Indian or Lebanese companies for further export to cobalt-
refining countries (China, Belgium, Finland and Canada). Our research confirms this point, 
but also finds that those companies always try to put pressure on the miners for the lowest 
possible prices. 
 Although not directly identified in the existing literature, studies do discuss how the 
DRC faces exploitation from foreign firms to attract industry and keep prices low. For 
example, Marysse and Geenen (2009) reported that between the 1990s and 2000s, the 
Chinese share in African trade jumped from 0.8% to 9%, more than a tenfold increase. In real 
terms, this increase was even larger, rising from $1.5 million in 1995 to $368 million in 2005. 
Copper, cobalt, and gold joint ventures with China are the largest trade investments China 
signed in all of Africa for that decade. But these agreements were criticized for unequal 
exchange, with China taking two-thirds of the profits. These agreements also enabled the 
Chinese to buy at prices below world market levels. They lastly stipulated requirements that 
the DRC would reimburse firms if they failed to meet expected production levels or profit 
margins.  Mohan and Power (2008) thus caution that mining will not challenge fundamentally 
Africa’s extroverted relationship with the world economy, which keep it at a perpetual 
disadvantage and locked into supplying raw materials to global markets, rather than adding 
value to the local economy.  
5.4 Political corruption and corporate malfeasance 
A fourth concern is more political, and it relates to the impact of mining on the 
erosion of national democracy as well as corruption within the state, as well as malfeasance 
among mining companies. Indeed, the author witnessed much of this general corruption 
firsthand, from the airport customs and immigration authorities (who asked for money) to 
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cashiers at grocery stores (asking for money or not giving change) to the national police, local 
police, and military (all asking for money). 
Expert Respondent 1 noted for example that “mining contracts and the mining code 
by and large have been merely instrumentalized to build wealth for powerful political figures, 
especially the President.” Community Respondent 1 stated that “mining in the DRC does not 
benefit local communities, it is only corrupt politicians who are getting rich.” Community 
Respondent 2 framed this actively in terms of democracy, saying that: 
The biggest threat to democracy as a whole in the DRC is not war, or poverty, but 
mining. Mining prevents the capability of the Congolese people to be governed by 
those they like. The mining sector and the state capture of resources undermines 
development for the whole country. It allows them to run the show and buy off 
whatever they need to prevent real democracy, freedom of speech, and free and fair 
elections.  Mining has undermined the whole nation. 
Expert Respondent 6 elaborated that: 
The political costs of cobalt mining are grave. Mining royalties create a very narrow 
political elite, particularly in Kinshasa, which results in counterproductive 
governance dynamics, where the elite are accountable to mining companies but not to 
the people. A toxic governance structure has arisen enclaved around mining benefits, 
and a small clique around the presidency. Cobalt mining has had very high growth 
rates the past decade, but most people have not shared or benefitted from that, 
instead, their situation has stagnated, or even gotten worse.  
Expert Respondent 3 added that even though there were many “honest, bright, non-corrupt 
people,” still “many mining inspectors are bought off” and “corruption is pervasive and 
usually backed with money and weapons.”  Expert Respondent 8 agreed that “corruption is 
rife in the DRC, the government shows little interest in anything other than mining, not health 
care, education, or public investments.”   
Some of the literature has confirmed aspects of this corruption. Amnesty International 
(2016a) documented that “state officials [are] aware of the mining activities taking place in 
unauthorized locations, but they also financially benefit from them. Officials from a range of 
different government and security agencies control access to unauthorized mining sites and 
demand illegal payments from artisanal miners.”  Kara (2018) also documented that 
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numerous diggers, especially children, reported that they pay bribes to local government 
authorities to ensure they could skirt around child labor laws and human rights protections.  
Zeuner (2018) argues that widespread corruption completely prevents the correct or equitable 
distribution of state revenue from mining.  Titeca and Edmond (2019: 542) identified parallel 
issues in another extractive industry, oil, and noted that “the main function of the oil sector is 
patronage and regime security” and that perhaps perversely, corruption was “too visible” to 
be punished.  
Calls for political reform seem stymied in the face of this corruption.  The ASM 
community, for instance, lacks an effective and nationally representative union, and 
organized social movements in the DRC for mining rights are scarce. Community 
Respondent 2 noted that the system itself was insulated from reform, with: 
A lack of cohesion to mobilizing against corruption … I have rarely seen communities 
push back against mining, even big industrial projects, there is no real opposition. 
The only opposition you see is those in dire straits, directly displaced or affected, 
mainly the artisanal miners.  But this is ad hoc, and site by site, not necessarily 
organized or lasting.”   
Expert Respondent 2 affirmed this and noted that:  
Protests are always very local and they are quickly shut down. They never spread. 
They involve rocks and the burning of the occasional truck, but they never result in 
any true diplomatic impact or pressure, no unionizing of cooperatives, no 
organization and more effective forms of protest. Whomever would defend these 
communities is usually bought off by the state or the companies. 
This inability for labor groups to protect workers has linkages to many of the other 
dimensions discussed in this section, including occupational accidents and patterns of 
exploitation.   
The World Bank (2007) confirmed this point when noting that “no democratic 
organization into associations or co-operatives is followed to provide a single ‘voice’ that 
could help the ASM in conducting pricing or workplace negotiations, mobilizing assistance 
programs, conducting awareness campaigns amongst its members and organizing security 
and other mine site related activities.” De Haan and Geenen (2016) even found that mining 
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cooperatives in another region of the DRC, South Kivu, further entrenched the exploitation of 
local miners after they were coopted by elite interests. 
 Even then, when local political actors may try to promote mining rights, or make 
public investments, they lack the fiscal skills or knowledge to make sound choices. Expert 
Respondent 14 commented that: 
Even when revenues end up in non-corrupt political institutions, they don’t know what 
to do. Local authorities are provincial and shortsighted. When awarded mining 
royalties, they never had so much money before, they don’t know how to spend or 
manage it well.  Mining companies can pay the taxes, but then the local authorities 
spend it on something ridiculous like 20 football fields. They are not trained in 
responsible fiscal management, or in designing community development funds. 
Expert Respondent 7 remarked that “sometimes you may have the best of intentions with a 
new political figure, but without a regime change and total political shift, even they can do 
little to improve the system.”  The implication is the improper training would still result in 
mismanagement even if officials didn’t have vested interests and/or a desire to be corrupt. 
 A final political risk from mining is corporate malfeasance alongside state corruption. 
Community Respondent 1 made a distinction between types of mining conglomerates, 
stating:  
Generally, European and American mining companies are respectful of the 
environment and communities. However, generally Asian companies (Chinese, 
Indian, etc.) or Australian companies are not respectful of the environment and 
communities. They actively corrupt the agents of the state who have to audit. 
Community Respondent 2 however challenged this point, noting “they are all bad” and that 
“Glencore and ERC are some of the least ethical players of all.” Expert Respondent 18 
remarked that “Companies like Glencore don’t care about the Congo at all. They only care 
about their own financial power, and their shareholders.”  Expert Respondent 20 agreed and 
stated that “industrial mining companies are benefitting from the weakness of the state, taking 
control in a vacuum and operating with accountability to nobody.” There is some evidence to 
back up these claims, with Katz-Lavigne (2019a) reporting that Glencore was sanctioned and 
fined (including the banning of executives) by the Ontario Securities Commission in Canada 
for misreporting the amounts of copper and cobalt extracted; the U.S. Department of Justice 
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was also investigating Glencore for bribery; and Glencore, ERC and Chemaf have bene 
linked to violations of environmental standards and/or other bribing scandals.   
5.5 Displacement of indigenous communities  
 Although less frequently mentioned, a fifth potent impact was the displacement of 
indigenous people as well as negative effects on community stability, including food security.   
 Expert Respondent 4 commented that: 
Mining activities do displace communities, you have the forcible moving of villages 
away from concessions, or changes in where the road goes, or the closing off of 
hunting grounds or agricultural areas.  This is especially the case for some 
indigenous groups or ethnic groups, who see their sacred sites disappearing or 
cannot get to fields or areas of cultural significance.”  
Community Respondent 1 framed it at the nexus of indigenous peoples, land rights and food 
security: 
As a mitigation measure, mining companies decide to move the communities 
(resettlement) by building new homes better than the first ones, which are destroyed. 
But really, you have degradation and acquisition of the land, and also pollution of 
other sources of livelihood from the collection of wood, mushrooms, or charcoal, as 
well as the loss of some medicinal plants.  The acquisition of their land for the 
construction of the mine's infrastructure, a factory, offices, mining traffic routes, etc., 
has harmful consequences that can lead to food insecurity and severe disruption to 
communities. In my view, indigenous communities are hit hard by these practices. 
Expert Respondent 5 mentioned indirect impacts such as how “an influx of miners, industrial 
or artisanal, can be a challenge for local communities, especially as they are their families 
take jobs and economic opportunities locals cannot complete with. Mining has a corrosive 
effect on indigenous groups and their identity, with communities usually suffering from lack 
of cohesion and tension.”  
Such sentiments, although less frequently mentioned, have been affirmed by some 
previous research. Tsurukawa et al. (2011) noted that because miners tend to have higher 
incomes than the rest of the population, their presence in a community results in local 
inflation and access to essential goods can become difficult for indigenous groups.  Over the 
longer term, interactions with mining communities can lead to other negative social impacts 
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within indigenous communities, including prostitution, polygamy, drug abuse, and 
alcoholism. Tsurukawa et al. (2011) also reported “claims of severe human rights violations 
towards Pygmy communities in the mining sector of Katanga.”  The World Bank (2007) 
cautioned that ASM activities can be corrosive on indigenous communities as well, with 
pupils leaving school to work on nearby ASM sites, and with many indigenous peoples 
deciding to abandon traditional livelihoods in favor of the “get-rich-quick” mentality of 
mining.   The World Bank (2007) also confirmed the effect of mining on local inflation, and 
linkages to the abandonment of farming and other traditional practices.  
New resource discoveries, when they occur, can contribute to community tension and 
conflict. The World Bank (2007) reported that whenever a new resource site is discovered, 
massive numbers of Congolese migrants “rush” into the area to try and extract the minerals, 
usually conflicting with local communities.  Then, once a new mining site is established, the 
World Bank (2007) noted a “boomerang effect” where the localized inflation brought about 
by mining then makes it harder for local communities to meet basic needs. This has led in 
some communities to higher costs for basic commodifies and food, increasing rates of 
malnutrition, and “new social problems resulting in xenophobia, community tension and 
antagonism.” 
5.6 Violence, riots and murder 
 A final serious risk is violent conflict and death. Expert Respondent 1 described: 
A constant state of conflict between ASM and LSM interests, with LSM companies 
forcibly evicting ASM miners from sites which can lead to protest and violent reaction 
against the mining companies, and against the state over processes of eviction.  The 
mining security forces escalate the conflict by arresting or beating protesters; the 
protestors respond by burning company trucks, throwing rocks, even burning or 
looting community development centers. 
Expert Respondent 2 noted that “many ASM workers are shot and killed.”  Expert 
Respondent 6 agreed and commented that: 
Cobalt mining perpetuates cycles of conflict and violence and political patronage to 
the very system that is leading to protesting, rebellion, and unrest.  There are even 
dozens of killings created by the military and police, who do repel armed attacks on 
mines. There is no such thing as clean or conflict free minerals when it comes to the 
DRC. 
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Expert Respondent 15 linked it back to the point above about corruption and violence going 
hand in hand,3 noting that “corruption has built an economic empire in the DRC, and like all 
empires, it has military strength and the ability to entrench and expand itself.”  
The miners the author spoke to, themselves, validated these issues, with Community 
Respondent 6, Community Respondent 14, Community Respondent 15, and Community 
Respondent 44 all mentioning being beaten, robbed, or detained by security forces or police. 
Community Respondent 45 framed it more as tensions and conflict between mining teams, 
the police, and industrial mining operations, saying “it’s almost like a third Congolese war 
sometimes.”  Community Respondent 1 discussed how clashes a few years ago in Kolwezi 
between ASM activists and a Chinese mining company left “several people dead, including 
expatriates.” 
 It was not only experts and diggers from mining teams that discussed such violence. 
Members of the police, unions, and bosses also confirmed these trends. Community 
Respondent 42, a member of the police, admitted that:  
The conflict between industrial and artisanal miners is very real. Because the main 
mining sites are now so secure, artisanal miners have been pushed to the periphery. I 
see them picking through the waste dumps and tailings, and they also are known to 
steal the batteries and fuel from our machines. When we catch them doing that, of 
course we beat them before we call in the police.  
Community Respondent 29, chief of an ASM team working in the Fungurume concession 
illegally, remarked that: 
We work on the illegal concession on the TFM plot, and we are always worried the 
police will come. We deal with harassment all the time, the police coming not in their 
uniforms, trying to catch us. Dogs barking.  Gunshots being fired. I have been 
arrested many times. If you are a digger or a trader or a dealer, it is always difficult. 
We are always running, always scared, always hunting, and always stressed.  The 
police take all of our money if caught. If we do not have enough money, they take the 
product; if not the product, they take our tools and materials. If we have none of 
those, we are beaten. This now occurs not only at mines, but also at the trading 
depots, where the police try to steal from us too.  
                                                 
3 See section 5.4 on “political corruption and corporate malfeasance.”  
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Community Respondent 40, a captain of the mining police, also said “my job is simple, to 
keep the concession clear of diggers, in every way possible. Illegal miners are parasites.” 
Callaway (2018) adds that due to the lack of regional stability, many mining sites are 
becoming increasingly militarized. They report that 18% of mines in Katanga are secured by 
the secret service and 13% by the Republican Guard, an elite security force controlled by the 
President of the DRC. The research team witnessed this militarization firsthand as well, with 
weapons, soldiers, and police everywhere in Katanga, and the author threatened more than 
once at gunpoint.  
 Such stark tensions have been repeatedly confirmed in the literature.  Katz-Lavigne 
(2019a) reports that after ASM workers are pushed off a concession for industrial foreign 
firms, the result is often a series of conflicts, injuries and deaths as miners battle with security 
forces.  Katz-Lavigne (2019b) notes how in Katanga, “LSM-ASM conflict manifests in 
multiple ways along a continuum, including no conflict; tense interactions and implicit threat 
of violence; the explicit threat of violence; the use of force to injure or sabotage; and the use 
of force to (attempt to) kill.”  She notes that many ASM miners are arrested; that while most 
security guards do not carry weapons, they still physically beat miners, sometimes repeatedly; 
and that it is not security forces that are always to blame, sometimes the miners themselves 
will attack security guards by throwing stones at them at train stations. Indeed, Katz-Lavigne 
(2019b) reported how at one mining company, 64 injuries of security guards were reported in 
2017. Radio Okapi (2018) reported that clashes between the mining police and ASM miners 
within the concession of TFM resulted in two diggers being killed by bullets. Tsurukawa et 
al. (2011) also confirmed that ASM miners who sneak illegally into concessions by night are 
often shot at, beaten, or drowned in waterlogged pits in the dark.  
6. Policy recommendations for improved mining governance  
 This part of the analysis relates not to benefits and risks, but policies for better 
governing cobalt mining in the DRC.  Given the dynamic and multi-scalar nature of the 
political economy of cobalt, this section has organized its suggestions across four different 
stakeholder groups: local and national government; industrial (and often foreign) mining 
companies; ASM miners and their communities; and the manufacturers of electronic products 
using cobalt. Table 7 previews and summarizes the policy suggestions for these stakeholders.  
Table 7: Seven policy suggestions for better governing cobalt mining in the DRC 
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Scale/Actor  Policy suggestion(s) 
National and local government  1. Enforce better occupational standards for ASM 
operations  
2. Form joint ventures with ASM and LSM interests  
3. Implement better dust and tailings management at 
LSM mines 
Industrial mining companies  4. Pursue broader and more robust community 
benefit sharing agreements  
ASM communities  5. Support training for alternative livelihoods  
Electronics manufacturers and 
suppliers 
6. Recognize the limitations of traceability schemes 
and formalization  
7. Do not ban ASM cobalt  
Source: Author. Note: ASM=Artisanal and small scale mining.  LSM=large-scale and 
industrial mining.  
6.1 National and local government  
For national and local government policymakers and planners, the data suggests three 
mechanisms: (1) enforce better safety and occupational standards and training for the ASM 
sector, (2) form joint ventures with ASM and LSM interests, and (3) implement stronger 
environmental safeguards at LSM mines. 
First, multiple respondents discussed how ASM workers will need mandatory 
guidelines that they wear protective equipment when they mine, that such equipment will 
need protected from theft or corruption, and that such responses need complimented with dust 
management and mine stability. Expert Respondent 3 warned that “currently, if you tell ASM 
teams to wear a face mask and protection, they are unlikely to do it, as it makes their work 
harder.”  Wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) is often proposed, but was 
recognized by multiple respondents as being both cumbersome for the operator and largely 
ineffective. Thus, they suggested that shoring mine shafts would be more effective at 
preventing fatal accidents than wearing hard hats; preventing dust generation at source is 
more useful than imposing dust masks (more on this below).  As Expert Respondent 3 noted, 
“Of course, appropriate PPE (helmets, respirators) are desirable, but should be considered 
as a second or third line in prevention.”  Expert Respondent 5 added that the DRC 
desperately needs “training and skills, especially at mining cooperatives, for local groups 
and artisanal miners, about workers’ rights and human rights.”  Expert Respondent 12 lastly 
remarked that “the government is responsible for giving ASM licenses, so they do have the 
authority to ensure that miners are adequately trained and supported—mining royalties, 
which represented more than $1 billion last year, could be put to better use this way.”  
Currently, neither the Mining Code nor DRC regulations offer guidance or enforced safety 
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standards about the use of gloves, facemasks, work clothes as well as the structural integrity 
of mines (Amnesty International 2016a; Amnesty International 2018; Lindberg and 
Andersson 2019).  
Second, to help mitigate tension between ASM and LSM interests, our empirical 
material suggested the government incentivize them to work together. Expert Respondent 21 
captured this statement most eloquently, when they noted that: 
In my view, a clever solution is to have mining concessions that allow both ASM and 
LSM. This hybrid approach can work quite well at supporting both types of mining.  
For instance, ASM miners are incredibly talented at efficiently extracting the best 
reserves closest to the surface.  Because the lead time for any LSM is often very long, 
at least a year, ASM can commence while LSM preparations are being made. ASM 
miners can even sell directly to the LSM firm.  Then, when LSM commences, it can 
reach the deposits too deep for ASM miners to reach.  A symbiosis of production can 
occur, with ASM working manually the easily exploitable reserves, and LSM tapping 
the harder to access reserves.  Everybody wins.  
Such a strategy would apply the current joint venture approach widely enshrined in the 
Congolese sector, but not outward towards foreign firms, instead inward towards artisanal 
mining groups and cooperatives. A strategy of LSM and ASM “coexistence” has already 
been piloted in at least one other country, Ghana, for gold (Aubynn 2009), although the 
mining regime there is notably different than the DRC. 
 Third and lastly, our data suggested the need for stronger safeguards at LSM mines, 
especially pertaining to mine dust and how security forces and the police treat ASM teams. 
Expert Respondent 1 emphasized that “dust is still a major problem both at and on the transit 
routes to LSM concessions.” Community Respondent 41 also remarked that “there is 
certainly room for improvement when it comes to the environmental performance of LSM 
sites.”  As a possible sign LSM firms are beginning to take these concerns seriously, ERG 
(2018) noted that they were implementing better tailings management and reclamation. 
Rather than leaving tailings scattered around Katanga, they promised to begin reprocessing 
them at a hydro-metallurgical plant. They also stated a commitment to restoring 
decontaminated mine sites and to rehabilitate degraded landscapes and watersheds. 
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6.2 Industrial and foreign mining companies 
 For industrial operations and foreign mining companies, our data strongly suggested 
the need for (4) greater benefit sharing with local communities.   
Expert Respondent 3 framed the problem as follows: 
The bottom line is people don’t have or earn enough money for the work they do. 
Miners but also teachers, nurses, government officials, it’s a low-wage and hyper-
poor economy. Being poor is much worse for your health than having a little or a lot 
of cobalt on your plate. The single most damaging effect on health is being poor, the 
poor live years less than those who are rich. So communities desperately need access 
to the mining royalties and the possible benefits.  
Expert Respondent 2 added that “given the government is known for corruption, it can easily 
be bypassed with better or stronger benefit sharing agreements, local taxation, and due 
process.”  For example, Canada already leads the way with explicitly defined Impact-Benefit 
Agreements, or IBAs, for mining communities, especially those near indigenous peoples. 
IBAs ensure that communities surrounding projects benefit from them and are compensated 
for negative impacts if they occur, especially vulnerable groups and indigenous peoples 
(O’Reilly and Eacott 1999-2000).  Some IBAs even require employment by local people, 
revenue sharing, reclamation procedures, cross-cultural training, and dispute resolution.  For 
instance, in the Canadian extractive industries sector, IBAs have required the involvement of 
Inuit businesses and communities in project contracts, established independent review boards, 
and funded social and educational programs (Impact Benefits Assessment Research Network 
2012).  One IBA mandates that the Inuit receive $14 million plus 4.5 percent of mining 
profits estimated at $60 million spread over 15 years from a particular mine.  
6.3 Artisanal miners and their communities  
For ASM communities themselves, especially local chiefs as well as labor and union 
representative, our data suggests (5) the need for training for alternative livelihoods not 
involved in mining.  Expert Respondent 5 framed it this way: 
We must move beyond pilots and goodwill.  They will be toothless without local 
leadership to protect artisanal miners. Mining communities and local leaders need to 
invest in alternative livelihoods, especially agriculture, and local procurement and 
contracting. They need to create an economy outside of mining.  
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Community Respondent 39, a miner, even agreed and said that “if local leaders would retrain 
us, if we could have responsible and well-paying jobs elsewhere, I would be very interested in 
learning new skills and opportunities.” The World Bank (2007) supported this contention 
when they suggested that local communities focus more on poverty alleviation broadly rather 
than just mining; that social programs better deliver basic infrastructure; and that local 
communities diversify so that economies are not so dependent on any single source of 
income.   
To be candid, such alternative livelihoods options are not always easy to pursue or 
effective by themselves. Perks (2011) for instance noted that smallholder rural agriculture 
was not always a viable alternative “exit strategy” to artisanal mining, with barriers extending 
across land access and tenure, skills, and wages.  So this study considers it merely one option 
among many, being perhaps necessary but not fully sufficient.   
6.4 Suppliers and manufacturers of electronics  
 Finally, for suppliers and manufacturers of electronics, our data suggested (6) 
recognizing the limitations of traceability and ethical minerals schemes, and (7) to not ban 
ASM cobalt. 
 Firstly, a great deal of attention has recently focused on fostering transparency and 
accountability of cobalt mining via traceability or ethical minerals schemes (Hilson et al. 
2016).  International groups including Amnesty International but also the United Nations and 
OECD have all called on mining companies to ensure their cobalt is not sourced from mines 
that involve illegal labor and/or child labor (Katz-Lavigne 2019a).  
ERG’s “Clean Cobalt Framework,” launched in 2018, for example announces seven 
principles or commitments it plans to meet within its supply chain: 
• Compliance with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains 
of Minerals; 
• Ensuring cobalt is free of child labor; 
• Requiring that cobalt sources are traceable; 
• Affirming that their cobalt does not come from artisanal and small-scale mining; 
• Committing to restoring the environment; 
• Collaborating to support sustainable community development; 
• Supporting the broader industry towards more sustainable cobalt value chains. 
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First Cobalt (2017) similarly has their “Responsible Cobalt Initiative,” RCS Global has its 
“Better Cobalt” program, the World Economic Forum (2018) launched a Global Battery 
Alliance committed to “responsible sourcing” of raw materials for batteries, and one local 
campaign is even called “Touche Pas à Mon Cobalt” (“Don’t Touch My Cobalt”) (Callaway 
2018). All of these efforts essentially aim to promote “ethical cobalt” and that “from stone to 
phone,” metal supply chains must be accountable” (Kara 2018).  
 Some of the respondents for this study did discuss the utility and desirability of these 
programs. Expert Respondent 2 remarked that: 
Suppliers must promote initiatives like responsible cobalt, which enhance supply 
chain visibility, accountability and transparency. We need to get children out of mines 
and into classrooms … Volkswagen and Tesla are dead scared of having illegal 
cobalt in their vehicle, they want to be able to pass that risk off to somebody else. So 
those initiatives become intermediaries who hold the responsibility for authenticating 
cobalt is clean. 
Expert Respondent 10 went further and suggested that such expert certification schemes be 
done not by individual suppliers, but entire sectors and groups of companies:  
At the moment, the leverage or role of any single company is small in terms of its 
cobalt demand.  The role of clean tech firms such as those making cars, batteries, or 
solar panels is particularly insignificant. The solution is to form coalitions across the 
entire mining activity, not just whittle away at specific mines or companies. There is 
no equivalent of a Walmart who have the power to shape supply. There needs to be a 
multi-mineral, multi-company, and also perhaps multi-technology consortium 
committed to traceability.  
However, Expert Respondent 3 noted such an approach has its limitations and needs 
implemented with care. As they countered:  
In practice, it is extremely hard for green or ethical expert certification schemes to 
work, especially when traders don’t know where cobalt comes from, in unmarked 
bags. And, people will hide children when they know inspections or the media are 
coming, then they reappear when the inspectors leave.  Or they all say they are 16 
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years old, when they are clearly younger.  Claims that there is no child labor are 
incredibly difficult to substantiate.  
Expert Respondent 6 added that: 
Don’t get me wrong, we need to distinguish between good and bad mining companies, 
but we need nuanced policy, not blunt instruments. My worry is due diligence with 
supply chains via mining companies and electronics companies will become a 
technocratic tick the box exercise, putting a tag saying this is clean cobalt, that won’t 
really benefit the local Congolese, won’t improve incomes for miners, or led to better 
labor conditions. Clean cobalt does not for the moment equate to sustainable 
livelihoods for those who most need income in the Congo. 
These comments imply traceability schemes may be impossible to fully enforce in practice, 
and could in the extreme merely become an exercise in public relations rather than improved 
governance.  Radley and Vogel (2015) raise many of these legitimate critiques with 
traceability schemes as a whole and the international debate on “conflict minerals.” 
Indeed, Vogel et al. (2018) show how already in the DRC, formalization and 
traceability have not worked when it comes to mining for 3T, where it merely replaced a 
military monopoly with a financial monopoly.  Hilson et al. (2017) similarly showed that 
formalization in Ghana and Niger did not have a positive or transformative effect on the 
mining regimes there.  In their review of formalization and traceability schemes across all of 
sub-Saharan Africa, Hilson et al. (2017) warn that such efforts have often resulted in a 
scarcity of permits awarded, exorbitant costs for miners to legalize their operations, and 
extremely lengthy and bureaucratic processes for registration.  Hinton et al. (2003) add that 
any strategy of formalization or legalization for ASM must understand that many miners will 
elect to work outside of a regulatory framework if obvious benefits exist to doing so, and that 
many miners do not have the resources or skills to participate effectively, including basic 
literacy.  
In tandem with this suggestion, our evidence robustly suggested that global suppliers, 
and governments, not ban ASM mining. Expert Respondent 6 explained that: 
Do not assume that all minerals in the Congo have labor rights issues and contribute 
to conflict. That is a fatal mistake, it is smarter to presume innocent until proven 
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guilty, let others keep operating. A blanket shutdowns benefit no one, and could do a 
great deal of harm. 
Expert Respondent 3 agreed and said: 
It would be a disaster if they made batteries without cobalt for Katanga and the DRC. 
We must see the cobalt there as an opportunity rather than a curse. Eliminating it 
from the global supply chain would keep them trapped in perpetual poverty.  
Sustainability must not come by turning all of the DRC into a victim.  
Expert Respondent 22 confirmed when they said “the last thing you want to do is to 
stigmatize the source of these metals.”   
Thus, the suggestions above talk about bringing ASM mining into joint ventures with 
LSM activities and also better implementing safety and health standards.  This could be why 
a consortium of fourteen nongovernmental organizations, including Global Witness and 
Amnesty International, recently cautioned against the banning of ASM cobalt on the London 
Metal Exchange (Shabalala and Desa 2019).  Faber et al. (2017) even noted that, 
counterintuitively, banning ASM could actually increase child labor by lowering household 
incomes.  
7. Future research directions  
 Our material lastly led to the identification of five suggestions for future research. 
7.1 Examine cocktails rather than single sources of pollution 
 One suggestion was that studies move beyond studying the pollution and health 
impacts of isolated cobalt, or even only metals, to other forms of pollution, including 
radionuclides such as uranium, and other pathways of exposure, including water and food.  
Community Respondent 2 stated that “more comprehensive research is needed to look at 
many environmental outputs, the modeling of multiple pollutants and exposure pathways.”  
Expert Respondent 14 explained that “in order to process cobalt, you need a substantial 
amount of chemicals, and it is difficult isolating their use, the cocktails they can use. 
Deformations also occur due to radioactivity in some of the deposits, elevated radioactivity 
levels, these are not proven yet, we need research to document their extent.” 
7.2 Improve corporate benchmarking and accountability mechanisms  
 Given that the corporate supply chains with cobalt and its refining tend to be opaque 
(Amnesty International 2016b), our respondents discussed the need for better corporate 
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benchmarking to understand which supply chains, especially for LSM, adhere to international 
standards and those that do not.  Expert Respondent 10 explained that: 
We don’t have good information or data on what happens inside Chinese mines, let 
alone African mining sites. Interviews are difficult to do, permission is rarely given, 
trade secrets prevent inquiry, and migrant workers don’t want to speak to you out of 
fear of being fired. It’s extremely sensitive politically, like the secret nobody wants to 
talk about. 
Expert Respondent 14 added that: 
In the industrial sector, there is some transparency, they sometimes work with NGOs 
who are allowed to go onsite and do human rights studies. At the same time, these 
Chinese, Indian, and Congolese companies are less concerned with human rights.  
Research needs to look very carefully from one company next to the other, and also 
trace joint ventures. 
Of particular importance is the relationship between foreign firms, especially those in China, 
and local Congolese firms and state actors, which need better documented and explored.  
7.3 Examine other parts of cobalt’s multi-scalar supply chain  
 This study has focused exclusively on mines, trading depots, and some upstream 
refining, but that is only a small part of the overall supply chain for cobalt.  Banza Lubaba 
Nkulu et al. (2009) note that other parts, in addition to open pits and underground mines, 
include washing plants and  concentrators, hydrometallurgical plants and smelters for cobalt 
and copper, which also produce zinc, arsenic, and cadmium as byproducts, and then global 
refineries where it is converted into cobalt oxide or cobalt sulfate. Rawles (2018) note the 
chemical processing of cobalt is often done in China, which has 80% of global processing 
capacity (and that number is rising).  Moores et al. (2019) note that from the perspective of 
particular products, such as batteries, mining is only the first stage of the supply chain; the 
second involves chemical processing and refining, the third cathode or anode production, the 
fourth battery cell manufacturing.  Amnesty International (2016b) tried to map some of the 
elements of the supply chain for Congolese cobalt and found it involved four separate 
continents shown in Figure 11. 
Figure 11: The complex and multi-scalar supply chain for Congolese cobalt  
The political economy of cobalt 66 
 
 
Source: Amnesty International 2016b. 
These other pieces of the supply chain are rarely examined. Expert Respondent 2 
affirmed that “As hard as it is getting data on the mining activities in the DRC, it’s still more 
available than the knowledge we have on other parts of the cobalt supply chain, especially 
refining and processing, usually in China. We know little to nothing about the health impacts 
for workers there, the environmental impacts of acid intensive chemical processing, impact 
on water and air and climate.”  This statement confirms the necessity of further work 
examining the whole systems, or multi-scalar, aspects to cobalt’s political economy.  Geenen 
and Cuveelir (2019) aptly identify how the heuristic of a Global Production Network and 
other spatial lenses can further reveal the scalar complexities of cobalt or other minerals.  
7.4 Recognize other vulnerable groups 
 While this study has demonstrated a collection of vulnerable groups to cobalt 
mining—including ASM miners, ASM communities, and children—these are not the only 
ones.  Community Respondent 7 for example mentioned that truckers such as them “drive 
raw cobalt to South Africa, usually to Durban, through Zambia and Zimbabwe. Along the 
way, I must always watch for military rebels and robbers across my 2,800 kilometer route, 
which takes 35 hours if I don’t stop.”   
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Given mining is gendered, women are another vulnerable group.  Cuvelier (2014, 
2017) has conducted ethnographic work with miners in Katanga, and concluded that the act 
of ASM changes household dynamics so that conspicuous consumption becomes a part of 
masculine identity, and that significant changes in household gender relations (and spending 
patterns) result.   Rustad et al. (2016) have also shown in the Eastern Congo, community or 
household proximity to ASM subject women to a greater incidence of sexual violence, with 
the risk of sexual violence from strangers (non-partners) particularly high for women living 
close to mines that also have armed guards. 
Thus, other possible vulnerable groups beyond miners worth examining include truck 
drivers transporting cobalt, women and the wives of miners, security guards (caught between 
LSM and ASM interests), and prostitutes (who were said to frequently visit mining camps).  
This heterogeneity of vulnerable groups also reminds us that no single community will have 
the same lived experience with cobalt mining, meaning that vulnerabilities will always be 
contextual and relational.   
7.5 The temporality of mining benefits and risks 
 Finally, although the benefits and risks of cobalt mining have been presented more 
inductively and thematically, there is also a temporal dimension that often goes unexamined.  
Some benefits, and risks, accrue in particular contexts, and their occurrence is dynamic and 
changes over time.  Many of our respondents, for example, noted that the initial benefits of 
cobalt mining can be seen as “alluring” or “addictive,” but later give way to displacement 
and disenfranchisement.  Bryceson et al. (2016) confirmed this in their own work on ASM 
for gold in the DRC, emphasizing the ephemeral nature of benefits.  At the beginning, ASM 
teams are willing to tolerate working in remote, difficult, and dangerous conditions and are 
motivated to take these risks to “strike it rich.” Nonetheless, as time wears on, the experience 
with mining becomes starker, with miners coming to acknowledge its challenges and then 
have to contend with its consequences.   Furthermore, Otchia (2019) writes how global 
commodity prices, especially for copper and cobalt, can strongly affect national and local 
prices and in term have significant impacts on trading patterns, exchange rates, and export 
revenues. As they warn, this means “commodity booms will not last forever” (Otchia 2019: 
279). Such temporal issues need better examined and accounted for in future research.  
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8. Conclusions 
 To conclude, the political economy of Congolese cobalt is precarious.  Artisanal 
mining operations, vital to the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of families, are 
essentially unsafe, ragged holes in the ground, with manual labor, children present, and 
miners so poor they dig without ladders or tools, some literally by hand.  Industrial mines are 
sophisticated operations similar to strip mining for coal in the United States, with much 
mechanization and automation, but similarly widespread impacts on the environment, 
including ubiquitous dust, the pollution of streams and rivers, and the complete relocation of 
indigenous peoples.  Some, like TFM, are massive, with a concession area more than 1,500 
square kilometers.  Environmentally, tailings reside everywhere, air and water pollution is 
widespread, and mining dust coats everything, from crops and schools to toys and roads. One 
respondent compared it to working on “the moon.”   
 The life of an artisanal cobalt miner is particularly dire.  They often spend 12 hours in 
a mine shaft and work through the night, their bodies ache and they always fear landslides or 
rockslides. Two spoke of nightmares, more than a dozen spoke of brothers, or friends, that 
have died in a mine, many also spoke of being beaten, chased, or shot at. ASM miners often 
develop respiratory diseases, heart diseases, or cancer, and have extremely high levels of 
toxic metals in their body. 
 Miners and the communities that they support, tragically, are exploited within this 
political economy in multiple ways.  ASM teams often occupy concession areas that LSM 
firms own or wish to access, creating tensions that ultimately lead to conflict, protest, theft, 
violence, and in some situations murder.  Women and young children are present across 
mining communities and often entrapped or victimized.  ASM miners have no safeguards 
with respect to their health or security, and they are also subjected frequently to corrupt and 
extortionist mining police, local political officials, or national officials including the 
Republican Guard.   Even traders and middlemen are reputed to charge usurious rates or 
undervalue the market price of cobalt. The extent of the trading, processing, sorting, and 
refining operations is extensive, with more than 200 “depots” for collecting the cobalt and 
copper witnessed by the author.  This job, even though it may exploit the diggers, is almost as 
tough: hauling around sacks weighing 60 to 90 kilograms, then sorting the deposits and 
manually crushing them with hammers.  These workers also spoke of health problems, 
fatigue, and being cheated out of fair wages. Even the exploiters of diggers are exploited by 
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someone else, and this is in a province known for being perhaps the “best governed” in the 
entire country.  
 These calamities with cobalt are a sharp contrast to the clean, shiny electronic 
products that depend on the very cobalt being mined. And for that, the consumers and users 
of a digital society are at least partially responsible, given that cobalt exists within a complex 
multi-scalar political economy involving local communities, national governments, and 
global technology suppliers.  As part of this system, we all share the some of the blame, with 
our insatiable demand for electronic products and a society addicted to digital technology.  
 Because of this political economy, it is likely the future of cobalt will remain 
contested and conflicted.  Someone stands to lose if cobalt mining patterns move in any 
direction: greater amounts of ASM will involve more children and women, more accidents 
and landsides, strengthened dependence on mining as a source of income, and deepened 
devastation local ecosystems. However, fewer amounts will result in unemployment and 
choke off what little state revenue trickles down to communities already scarred by decades 
of chronic poverty, corruption, war, and conflict, with many of the most affected people 
orphans or former refugees.  Put another way, Congolese cobalt operates within a 
complicated political economy where any attempt to reform livelihoods, manage practices, or 
govern supply chains will alter power dynamics in ways that may only entrench some degree 
unsustainability or inequality. If it is, as one of our respondents stated, akin to a “third 
Congolese war,” it is a low-intensity conflict with chronically occurring impacts. Or as 
Community Respondent 2 summarized, “cobalt mining contributes to a constant tension 
between communities relocated and those that are not, between artisanal mining and 
industrial mining, between the rich in three story houses and those living in abject poverty in 
huts. Cobalt means conflict.” Perhaps perversely, the more extensively embedded cobalt 
mining becomes to livelihood and identity in the DRC, the more exposed communities also 
become to its risk. 
 There is, nonetheless, a promising pathway forward, with this study identifying seven 
interrelated policy suggestions that would improve the sustainability and governance of 
cobalt mining.  Enforcing better occupational standards for ASM miners would mitigate the 
risk of landfills and accidents, and the forming of joint ventures with ASM and LSM interests 
would ease tensions between the two groups. Better environmental management and 
reclamation at LSM mines would improve community health, and broader and more robust 
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community benefit sharing agreements would ensure the Congolese themselves benefit more 
directly from mining. Mining communities can diversify away from mining to support 
training for alternative livelihoods. Transnational suppliers of electronics goods can also 
come to recognize the limitations of traceability schemes, and to value and accept ASM 
cobalt.  The implication here is that improving the political economy of cobalt is a 
multidimensional and multi-institutional process.  Perhaps most of all, it underscores the 
necessity of a diffuse chain of actors—including governments, technology firms, and 
consumers—accepting their own responsibility in the plight of the Congolese people. 
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10. Appendix 1 Registered Mining Companies in the DRC 
Domestic mining companies  
• Africa Smelting Corporation Sprl 
• Amani Consulting Sprl 
• Austral Africa Resources Ltd 
• Boboko Investment Pte Ltd 
• Congo Cobalt Corporation 
• Congo Dongfang International Mining Sprl 
• Congo Mineral Resources Sprl 
• Congo Mining Co. Sprl 
• Diamond Industry Associates Ltd 
• Exploitation Artisanale Du Congo Sprl 
• Kasai Wa Balengela/ Tshiamalamuikila 
• Margaux Sprl 
• Mine De Kawama 
• Mine De Likulu Kisenge 
• Minière de Bakwanga Sarl 
• Mining Company Katanga Trucks Sprl 
• Mining Mineral Resources Sprl 
• Namakwa Diamonds Ltd 
• New Stone Mining Sprl 
• Nucoco Sprl 
• Pangimines Sprl 
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• Phoenix Mining Corporation Sprl 
• Rubamin Sprl 
• Shituru Mining Corporation Sprl 
• Slag Treatment Plant Lubumbashi 
• Société Minière de Kilo-Moto Sarl 
• Sojofils Mining (Pty) Ltd 
• Somika Sprl 
• TSM Enterprise Sprl 
Foreign mining companies 
• Glencore (Mutanda Mining Sprl, Katanga Mining Ltd) 
• Camrose Resources 
• Katanga Minerals 
• Premiere Miniere Du Katanga 
• Anvil Mining Congo Sarl 
• Benzu Resources Ltd 
• Camrose Resources Ltd 
• Chemaf Sprl 
• Compagnie Minière du Sud Katanga Sprl 
• Congo Minerals Sprl 
• Frontier Sprl 
• Groupe George Forrest Internationale Afrique Sprl 
• Jindal DRC Sprl 
• Katanga Minerals Processing 
• Kibali Goldmines Sprl 
• Kolwezi Investments Ltd, Frontier Sprl 
• La Compagnie minière de Sakania Sprl 
• Loncor Resources Inc (Prior to Acquisition by Nevada Bob’s International Inc) 
• Luisha Mining Enterprise Sprl 
• Miniere Musoshi Kinsenda 
• Mining and Processing Congo Sprl 
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• New Congo Resources Development Company Inc 
• Pangimines Sprl 
• Premiere Miniere Du Katanga 
• RAK Minerals & Metals Congo FZ - LLC 
• Roan Prospecting & Mining Sprl 
• Rockbury Properties Ltd 
• Ruashi Mining Sprl 
• Shamika Resources, Inc 
• Société Minière de Kolwezi Sprl 
• Tenke Fungurume Mining Sprl 
 
